The Audacity of the Grand Bargain

Seventeen years after George H. W. Bush signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, committing the U.S. to seek greenhouse gas emissions limits, one chamber of Congress finally passed the first U.S. climate change bill in history. Coincidentally this fell on my birthday- I always thought I was the climate messiah. Too bad the 1300 page American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 is full of so many complicated, unnecessary and potentially dangerous provisions. The proposal commits the U.S. to reduce emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below by 2050, sets up a 20% renewable energy portfolio standard by 2020, and establishes a menagerie of committees, criterias, offsets, definitions and standards on how to measure and verify everything, all to be figured out later when these regulations are drafted.

This bill hands out all rights to emit carbon dioxide and five other gases to industries for free, in direct contrast to Obama’s campaign pledge. The results are windfall profits and the potential for an energy driven asset bubble. It provides no assurances that the price placed on carbon will actually be one that makes clean energy profitable, which was exactly the experience in Europe when they established the same system in 2005. Credits were handed out for free, and in order to get votes everyone got a big piece of the pie (resulting in more credits being handed out than there were emissions), and the price has hovered at near $0 per ton ever since, while Europe has lived with a huge regulatory bureaucracy and burden while actually increasing its greenhouse gas emissions. And if the price of carbon gets “too high”, well then more permits are handed out for free to lower the price. And if the price is still too high, well then the cap no longer applies, so everyone paid a lot of money for a big complicated system that didn’t reduce emissions. Not to mention that we are in the midst of the worst recession in three generations, largely precipitated by an asset bubble and excessive speculation in the housing market, a market that has been studied and regulated for hundreds of years. This bill sets up a multi-trillion dollar market for the next 50 years, one in which the U.S. has no experience. The same people who pushed this through so voraciously will be the same ones decrying the excesses of carbon credit default swaps and derivatives in 10 years after we have seen another huge unsustainable bubble pop.

Then there is the issue of offsets, new emissions credits that can be generated when firms offset their emissions with something that captures carbon. Except, what exactly that means and who measures it will be figured out later by the Department of Agriculture. This will take years and many lawsuits to resolve, and even then the standards may be overly broad and subject to some very clever abuse by Wall Street, who frankly I put my money on over USDA any day of the week when it comes to cleverness. Not to mention the agriculture community is in large part the regulated party, a slight conflict of interest. Then there are the trade sanction provisions. This will allow the U.S. to bring action in the WTO and UN against countries who “artificially subsidize” their products by not attaching the same carbon price as the U.S. India and China have already drawn a line in the sand and said they will reciprocate any climate change tariff or quota and challenge our actions via arbitration, which typically takes about a decade to resolve. Of course by the time this is resolved we’re already supposed to have reduced emissions nearly 20%, so we’ll either have to march on with significantly high energy costs while India and China walk, or wait until a nasty trade dispute is resolved. And of course the bill raises $650 billion in new tax revenues, not to be recycled back to the American people.

Much superior to this convoluted grand bargain, we should place a price on carbon so it is the cheapest alternative, rebate it back to the American people, and cut out 1000 pages of special interests pay-offs in the process. If we want a clean energy economy, we don’t need the government telling every business and consumer exactly how much carbon they can emit every year for the next 50 years. And we don’t need dozens of new programs and thousands of new bureaucrats trying to figure out how much we’re emitting in the first place. All we need is for clean, renewable energy to be cheaper than dirty finite energy. If clean energy is cheaper, consumers will buy it, there will be demand pull. If clean energy is cheaper, it will represent a larger profit margin and greater return on investment for producers, there will be supply push. The price is the market maker, not the government. This bill could very well result in the grotesque situation of firms producing unprofitable products for consumers who are forced to pay more for them. Many people on the Hill act as though once you acknowledge the reality of climate change, there can only be one way to address it. There is no discussion of the multiple potential approaches and associated tradeoffs. Just one bill, and a lot of gray-haired men ramming it down everyone’s throat. The consequences of such little context for debate could be some very unintended consequences.

The Obama Administration is pushing hard on so many mega issues- health care, financial regulatory reform, energy and climate change, the largest budget in the history of the world, and now it looks like immigration too. The implicit tradeoff with this ‘boil the ocean’ approach, in contrast for instance to a more incrementalist one, is it requires engagement with the entire universe of very powerful special interests. You either have to commit to hard slow negotiations with the lobbies, and take very public and potentially damaging defeats in the process, or give them broad sway in order to get votes and flattering headlines, but live with policies you may come to regret. Obama and chief whip Emmanuel have consciously chosen to attempt to complete their entire agenda in what would be a truly historical first term (and guarantee for a second) in exchange for being very willing to play ball with the interests they want to regulate. The stimulus was a prime example. The White House sent a list of broad goals and top line numbers up to the Hill, and like throwing meat to a pack of ravenous dogs said, “fill in the details.” Lobbyists get a bloated bill full of new government contracts, Congress gets the support of their local haymakers, and the White House gets a resounding legislative victory. We also get a lot debt, a still increasing unemployment rate, and a bill the American people are increasingly souring on. If all that bill produces is a few hundred thousand jobs, and nearly a trillion dollars in new debt, that could be just the opening the GOP needs. (*POSTSCRIPT: Excerpt from Fall 2010 Paper: "Mr. Obama is already faced with the reality that voters have, fairly or not, decided that his first big effort to revive the economy, the $800 billion package enacted right after he took office, was a qualified failure, and that anything tagged as further 'stimulus' will be cast by Republicans as throwing good money after bad.")

And if all this climate bill produces is mountains of new regulations, costs, and system gaming, with few emissions reductions (like Europe), then the White House just gave the GOP a gaping hole to meander through. Obama said at the time he was pushing the stimulus, "my job depends on this bill"- he knew the risk he was taking. If politics is the art of the possible, then this is some very fine art. Perhaps it’s impossible to achieve much better, but we won’t know unless we try. The bill that was passed Friday shows more about how many people want to be Rahm Emmanuel’s friend, and who don’t want to cross Henry Waxman, than about who wants to actually usher in a clean economy in the most efficient way.

the royal treatment

The other day I tripped over a branch in Rock Creek Freeway (some would call it a park, but whoever thought putting a busy road absolutely parallel to a beautiful creek packed with birds, strollers and generally other important things should revisit urban planning school), except I didn’t realize I had tripped over this enormous Amazonian vine crossing the roadway until I had gotten off the ground to look back and indeed realize there was this freakish vine running across the road. In the time it took me to get up this erudite 60ish master of the universe gentleman type biking my way shouted at me “YOU should have picked that up!” To which I apologized profusely for tripping and agreed yes, I should have had some kind of pre-cognition that I was about to eat shit. Clearly being a selfish gen-y wasteoid meth addict, I had lazily chosen to trip over the vine rather than remove it. I really would have picked it up, just as soon as I realized it, and my face, was fucking there! I then asked him if he had any good stock tips, whether he was Yale ’67 or ’68 and inquired as to whether he wanted some grey poupon slathered on his ass.

This is my Mr. Rogers moment for why sometimes we need to look in the mirror, and see if the guy above is staring back. Because it’s too easy in high places like DC, with powerbrokers and lobbyists and lawmakers and Honorifics and executives sashaying through their populated schedules on the reg, to watch someone eat shit over a branch and blame them for not not de-littering the park. Sometimes this town can pass a $900 billion law before it can show kindergarten level humanity.

Majestic wonder

One of the most momentous and world impacting events of the 21st century occurred last week when Blink 182 reunited and took the stage once again. It included the usual incredibly choreographed and executed dance moves, poetic interludes and quaint heart wrenching double-necked guitar solos. All the hallmarks of punk rock mastery was there- most importantly perhaps telling the nation’s largest wireless carrier to go suck it, or how they’re planning High School Musical 5: The Tour.

Travis Barker is one of the most intense and effortless drummers to ever get behind the kit, Hoppus is a workaholic bassist and becoming a versatile producer, and Tom Delonge’s name rhymes, and when he wants can be one of the most irreverent and sensitive lead singers to ever strap one on. I have night sweats about turning into someone who goes to see John Foggerty or Styx 3-5 decades after their prime, where a concert feels like some previous generations’ past rock anthems were preserved on a slide and endlessly replicated in some tour promoter’s lab experiment, but Blink’s not there yet. Thomas is only 33 and still looks like he wants to push the boundaries, and they still have the youth to record new edgy, violent stuff.

Blink going on hiatus was unexpected, but I can’t help but feel they all got better in the interim. Travis started doing beats and drums with DJAM, and if there were any holes in his rhythmic Chinese wall he certainly plugged them. Mark became more of a musical philosopher, dishing out impressively thorough and researched podcasts and blogs while also becoming a producer. And Tom explored new synth sounds and still better dance moves. And I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Blink broke up within a month of George W. getting re-elected, when Tom’s brother was fighting in Iraq. It clearly permeated his playing and writing the next several years, and I don’t think them reuniting within a month of Obama taking office is random either. Blink springs eternal. But maybe I’m thinking too small. God himself may have reunited Blink. In the course of just a couple months, their long-time producer sadly died, two of their best friends were tragically and horrifically killed, and Travis literally walked away from a freakish plane crash. It was a reminder that sometimes there are causes and connections bigger and more important than you’ll know. That sometimes doing something because it feels right and good and crazy is enough, and maturity means often being okay with emotions, drama, egos and doubt- the hallmarks of immaturity. That you can still love people while you’re hating them. I guess this is growing up.

Stress Testing

Banks do stress tests all the time, you can’t plan for what you don’t understand or measure. And banking supervision is a full-time job. Balance sheets change in value daily, new assets come on the books daily, and the economy is fluid. Banks have full-time examiners who are continuously measuring their loan levels, estimating the potential loss exposure, and then requiring loss reserves accordingly. So the idea that these stress tests were rolled out as a big bold new policy, and then so publicly announced, seems off-base and represents an unnecessary policy risk.

One, the necessity of these “new" tests just show that the regulators failed to begin with, that they didn’t even know the basic exposure of the banks in the first place, and still didn’t. And two, the whole basis for the test is to prepare for contingencies, things that haven’t and very well may not happen. Like a “stress” case and a “worst” case. Chairman Bernanke characterized these cases as “unlikely”, yet they are the basis for requiring firms to raise more capital, either by selling off potentially valuable assets (like Citi did with its Japan brokerage), diluting existing shareholders by converting government loans to common stock, or by taking on more debt. All things that shouldn't be done simply because of unlikely assumptions. In addition, the tests created significant anxiety and hurtful market expectations for weeks preceding the tests. Once the results were leaked and it was clear the banks already had the ability to close the so called gap, the market cheered accordingly. But what if the gap was much larger, then this policy would have created a panic of sorts, causing many funds and investors to dump financials further- tangibly hurting the bank’s ability to raise capital, all because of hypothetical and “unlikely” assumptions about capital they might need should the situation deteriorate. Except that the reason for the deterioration could have been the anxiety created from the tests themselves. Thank goodness the banks had been stockpiling money for months anticipating this- if the gap had been larger this stress test would have just set back a huge rally by throwing its full weight behind assumptions and creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. To minimize this risk, the tests should have been called simulations and been completely internal between the supervisors and banks, so regulators could know exactly how much capital to inject under worsening conditions, and the banks could come up with a plan to execute in such an event. Instead, by forcing the banks to raise the money automatically, and practically broadcasting every discussion with the world, it was akin to evacuating a theatre full of people just as the curtain starts to rise because, well there’s no fire- but there could be.

This policy was a big roll of the dice and continues to show the youth of Treasury Secretary Geithner. These sorts of tests should not be confused with reality, and should be routine functions of the supervisors, not spectacles we all hold our breath for. Additionally, why they used tangible common equity as the definition of capital and not Tier I has yet to be answered. The big banks have 10%+ of capital they could access, but only about a third of it is common stock (considered a safe liquid asset). So, these tests probably understated their true capital level by about 70%. I’m glad this turned out as well as it did. But it’s only because we lucked out and didn’t have a full stampede out the door when the government yelled “fire!” in a crowded room.

The Markets could use some Pepto Bismol

As the stock market continues another whipsaw reversal of recent gains, counter intuitively 90 minutes after the largest deposit institution in the country reported double the profit from a year ago – I have one question: how is it possible that the markets, particularly financials, will not recover? Even disregarding the across the board strong profits of the remaining major financials in the last quarter, I defy anyone to explain how the fundamentals will not lead to a strong rebound in the mid-term (becoming shorter every day). Another interesting question is how much of the major bankruptcy and wealth destruction we’ve seen is a result of the bubble bursting versus people reacting to the bubble bursting? Washington Mutual for instance had significant write-downs on mortgages, but it also had $16b in withdrawals in its final week and a 90% drop in common share value over just 6 months. A situation like this will throw any company into trouble, whether it has a toxic or fortress balance sheet.

This is an especially interesting question because writedowns on assets are not losses. One, they are not realized, they don’t represent an actual outflow of cash, just a revised downward multi-year estimate which effects the current valuation, and two, they only really effect cash flow to the extent the market reacts adversely. Write-downs are serious and hurt balance sheets, but it is generally a very long-term signal with a lot of noise. Long-term because mortgages and bonds typically have a maturity lasting decades, and noisy because the characteristics of these securities as a whole is always changing based on the current underwriting standards of newly issued assets. But the market (read herd) takes this rather broad signal and immediately forces a translation into very short-term price signals. And I’m not sure the conversion factor is always spot on. To date the banks have written off several hundred billion in mortgages from their balance sheets, a significant shock no doubt, while the stock market has shed over $2 trillion in wealth. In other words, the market capitalization losses sustained is something like six times the actual writedowns. This is an even stronger shock when there is a run on existing contracts, from deposits to insurance product. The government realized in the 20s the unnecessary and preventable impact such reactions could have, and the FDIC has largely prevented it in commercial banks. That no such authority existed for multi-unit banking corporations like AIG or Lehman was rather remarkable considering how central to the financial system they had become.

Rather ironically, the only long term threat I see to robust bank recovery is the federal government. Unless people suddenly break a 10,000 year tradition, people will need shelters, likely, I know this is a stretch, in the form of houses. The rate of population growth and replacement dictates that about 1.3 million new homes need to be built in the U.S. as an annual baseline. In the last 12 months something like 400,000 were built. So the actual housing recovery timeframe is just a function of how big one thinks the bubble is, how big the surplus inventory is. I don’t think it’s much above 1 million, and we’ve already burned off about 900,000 of it. The rubber should finally hit the road soon. And once we get back to a supply-demand driven housing market, it’s hard to imagine that all these homes won’t require financing. In fact, 99.9% of them will. Pretty much everyone who doesn’t have a Louis-V with a milli in it like Lil Wayne will need the services of Bank of America or Citi or Wells Fargo. Thus, their first quarter earnings don’t seem to be mirage at all, more like a harbinger.

So there is more recovery in the pipeline, particularly when most of the recent earnings came from fixed-income arbitrage in a historically robust bond market. I have yet to hear anything close to a lucid argument that explains how housing and finance will not recover. And because prices have been falling for 16 months now, when it does turn it will likely have some strong inflection points. Balance sheets could reinflate relatively quickly as sideline homebuyers finally get on the field. The only potential long-term complicating factor here (assuming underwriting standards improve) then is the little issue of either servicing the government’s preferred stock loans, or worse selling off their common stock should they choose to convert it. The government should only consider converting their shares to equity if the stress tests show huge gaps that can absolutely not be filled any other way. And considering Citi, BoFa, JP Morgan, Wells all have 10% plus Tier I capital, and Treasury has $100 billion in the vault from TARP, and Goldman and Morgan already want to payback, I think the extent to which this has already been considered and bantered about as a serious idea is borderline irresponsible. We already know the market’s response to this rhetoric will dwarf the actual effects of any such real action. In fact, if the current sell-off continues investors can literally do whatever they want.

GM/White House need to think outside the box

The auto industry bailout should be a coordinated framework to re-imagine personal transportation in this country- including electricity providers and boutique next generation auto startups, not just two imperiled giants. Focusing simply on making GM and Chrysler cash flow positive with newly innovated offerings and lower debt burdens might do the job, but it ignores how integrated and market-infrastructure dependent the auto industry is. After this perfect economic storm, there will very likely be little space in the future for the government to intervene wholesale across the financial and auto landscape as they have in the last 6 months, and little opportunity to bridge the auto manufacturers and electricity producers’ interests.

The Administration only has so much credibility in lecturing the private sector how to make a buck, and only so much room to leverage the benefits of examining the sector in totality. By focusing on the manufacturers in isolation, the government risks supporting fuel efficient vehicles while leaving electric infrastructure developers on the sidelines. The Energy Department has $100 billion in new loan/grant authority, and could indirectly support the automakers by investing in companies like Better Place and Coulomb that develop the electric fueling stations that are a prerequisite for any true Detroit game-changers. The plug-in electric gas hybrid Chevy Volt will be substantially more expensive than an average car to begin with, curtailing sales and lengthening innovation cycles while stalling recovery. Costs will come down only with significant volume, which is a mere pipedream absent a national charging network. And in a world poised to add a billion new cars in China and India in the next 20 years, this is no longer just a matter of pristine design, but self-preservation. Making sure the market infrastructure is there when the new Volt rolls off the line is just as important as making sure they have competitive compensation agreements or streamlined supply lines.

Similarly, private startups operating today at the forefront of auto development, like Tesla Motors, could benefit from the breadth and relative financial depth of the big automakers, while the big automakers could benefit from their new platforms and next generation technology. Joint operating agreements or tech for equity swaps could speed up the bigs’ innovation while giving struggling and investment heavy startups (Tesla is asking for government cash) the market exposure they need to drive costs down. A note of caution however, this is not to say the government should impose anything. The big prize that awaits in the coming years and decades for clean energy winners, and the fierce competition among private actors it will engender, is a catalyst that should not be muted. However, the government and its auto task force is the perfect forum and moderator for getting these parties in a room to talk and see what pencils out. At a minimum they could talk about the non-exclusive aspects and infrastructure they will all need and brainstorm a general strategy, and at most cut some very lucrative deals.

It’s always the time for bold thinking, but very rarely is there the opportunity to actually implement it. The current public appetite for grand new economic architectures (whether TARP or TALF or the Legacy private-public partnership or the auto bailout or the Housing Plan or the Stimulus) is fast dissipating. Ad hoc investments in whatever the market would bare got the industry to this point, and ad hoc government negotiations and a spattering of tiny grants all over the place will just be further death by a thousand cuts.

A Simmer Down Now

Nobel winning economist and liberal zeitgeist Paul Krugman suggested today with a straight face that we return to a financial system, as he put it “like the 60s” - pure depository institutions saving and lending with little to no securitization or hedging. He also seemed to half-heartedly pick a fight with Larry Summers. I hope Larry will put down his 17th diet Coke of the day for a moment and take 20 minutes to draft a response for next week’s Financial Times. It would be a debate we would all benefit from. But then again maybe Summers thinks Krugman’s argument is too much of a straw man, too weak and unthreatening to solicit a response.

Krugman’s general sentiment is dead on, in that the financial system of the future cannot replicate the one we’ve just had. But this does not mean we have to roll back all financial innovation in extremus. This doesn’t mean we need to purge Wall Street or banks of anything that is a little complicated. I think more than anything else it means we just need more checks and balances, or in some places the creation of them, like over the counter trading. And it means we need to “keep it simple stupid.” The experiences of the last 6 months are not so much about the creation of new or wildly complicated financial products, as it is a reminder that firms need at least 5% or so cash on hand and need to verify the information their loans are based on (e.g. mortgage applicants). If these two things had been in place we wouldn’t be here today, and Krugman would not have the bully pulpit to adopt his pseudo neo-Ludite financial perspective.

Look at it from the perspective of a newly graduated college student with a decent job, who wants to buy her first house. The ability of this person to get a loan, and the interest charged on it is directly related to the willingness of banks to provide it. A typical bank will have 90% of their portfolio seeking a return in some respect. A good deal of these will be wrapped in recourse debt instruments to provide diversity, and often produce a margin via selling. This diversity represents more risk control for the banks and thus confidence to lend, and this margin represents more money the bank can lend, and thus more favorable credit terms for our post-collegiate house owning aspirant. And the security is only unsustainable, only contributes to a bubble, if the face value is below the current value of the future cash flows – e.g. if significant numbers of those who borrowed the consumer debt that stands behind the security will not actually pay up. This risk can be prevented quite easily with accurate information about the borrowers. This is widely applied today in the government’s new housing plan, which won’t deal with potential borrowers above a 38% debt/income ratio. Of course, to determine this you have to actually record this information. A greasy-haired condo pusher in El Paso wasn’t always accurately reporting this information to banks, surprise surprise! and banks were eager to make the deal anyway to push it up the chain. But this little scheme does not mean securities cannot be properly valued. In fact it just means the Fed needs to require actual records of income to be reported, as they did in February. So, securities can actually be worth more than their market price, and it’s good for the investor who sees a profit, good for the banks who generate more financing, and good for our college grad who can afford a slightly better house on better terms. Krugman would have us, in one radical fell swoop, nix this whole concept. Dangerous idea.

The other part of his argument attacks the big spooky market of derivates, e.g. futures, options and swaps- concepts that have only been around for hundreds of years- from farmers wanting to protect their crops from future unpredictable weather to British spice traders who didn’t want their global deals to be subject to the volatility of foreign exchange currencies. Derivatives just allow risk control, and if you happen to control this risk yourself, an incentive to do so in the form of profit. And yes, rules need to be in place. Like the degree of leveraging and collateral, or who’s trading where- tracking all this is in the works. Yet high finance is not the only place where Lord of the Flies will play out if there aren’t basic rules, and this caveat is no reason to pick on Wall Street. The credit default swaps (you will swap money for my asset if it turns out to totally suck) fiasco with AIG was not a result of the derivatives or futures system, but because they invested in a bubble (quite happily) and didn’t have nearly enough cash on hand to meet their obligations. Options and swaps are banks’ insurance, and without them they will understandably lend a lot less. Which means Krugman’s argument hurts just about everyone who wants to ever use money for anything. We require insurance for a $2,000 Datsun with 270,000 miles, it's the law, why would we not have insurance on $1 billion in mortgage loans? Or 20 million barrels a day of crude that we import? Or pensions? Or… Risk control is paramount and lowers the costs of financing and increases the availability of productivity enhancing capital. Keep it simple stupid.

Cap n’ Trade = Tax n’ Trade = Tax n’ (Bubble + Windfall)

There has been a lot of talk about a market-based cap and trade system as the ticket to a clean energy future. It’s a good solution. It could work. But it also carries significant risk, risk that a revenue neutral price signal (tax) would not. A recent MIT report highlights the expediency involved in getting climate policy right the first time. This 2009 study projects a median increase of 5.1 C (9.2 F) by 2100, up from a 2003 projection of 2.3 C. This kind of warming will have serious implications on everything from biodiversity to agricultural and forestry production to sea levels on a scale of meters. Any policy the United States seriously puts in place will take years. The EPA for instance has just completed a draft mandatory reporting rule for every producer that emits more than 25,000 pounds of GHGs a year, about 13,000 in the U.S. It has taken years of dialogue to get to this point. The rule still has to be finalized, then a registry set up ands tested, and then the actual cap would have to be developed, and then a tidal wave of litigation resolved. The point is, after all of this is sorted through, the system we get better work. Because of the potential for bubbles, price manipulation and windfall profits in a cap system, there is an elevated risk that it might not. The resultant public pushback and backlash in Washington could very well cause significant modifications if not outright repeal of such a system.

There are three basic issues with a cap system: 1) it’s just a nicer word for a tax because a cap creates scarcity which increases prices 2) even if the permits are auctioned off at the outset if can still result in huge windfall profits that can distort markets and create bubbles and 3) there is an implicit trade-off between price volatility and emissions reductions. This last point is because there is either a price ceiling or there isn’t. Without one, prices can be as high as the market will allow. In the case of the acid rain market, permits got above $1,000/ton and last year showed 75% year over year price volatility. This is far from good for businesses, investors or consumers. And this is in a market where there are readily available technological substitutes. Low sulfur coal is abundant. Scrubbers that capture SO2 and NO2 exist and are cheap. The same is not true for GHG reductions, so there is every reason to think that without a ceiling the price in the GHG market would be higher not lower than the already very high-priced and volatile acid rain market. However, if there is a ceiling, it is maintained in the same way the Federal Reserve targets interest rates, by open market operations with a reserve of credits. In the Fed’s case, reserves in cash, in the GHG market the reserves would be GHG credits. But what happens if you run out of these credits held in reserve? In other words, what happens if it takes more credits than have been set aside to deflate the price to the level prescribed in law? Well then you just create more permits, oh and there goes the whole point of the system – because you’re above the cap, e.g. you’re not reducing emissions which is a primary purpose of the system.

And it is often said that the issue of windfall profits, assigning private rights to a previously non-exclusive public good (like atmospheric emissions) that enriches the recipient of the now newly minted asset class, can be solved with a 100% auction system. Why is this an issue? Say the auction sells credits to the market at $5/ton CO2. The EU and Chicago Climate exchange (the largest U.S. exchange for GHG emissions) have historically traded CO2 at around $4 ton, so in all likelihood $5 is a very high initial assumption and it’ll be more like $2. But even if it’s $5, these permits will be held onto by the market until they appreciate. And the anxiety alone of a new energy scarce world will probably lead to significant appreciation right away. Not to mention that when a firm needs to buy these credits they have few short terms options and so it’s not hard to imagine them being bid up. Now if the price in the market is $20/ton, then there is a 300% windfall, the asset netted 3x what it cost, equivalent to a 75% subsidy. If there was no auction, the windfall would be infinite (something for nothing) – so it’s less windfall than without an auction, but still a windfall. Windfalls are basically strong subsidies, and subsidies distort price signals, create artificial value and expands the size of the market because of the elasticity of demand. So there is value creation absent new productivity, and absent new wealth creation these prices can not be supported indefinitely, they will have to fall. E.g. a classic boom and bust cycle – originating in windfall profits. In short, if firms get assets that trade at $20 for $5 they have a $15 profit margin, which is a good thing for the firm, but that $15 now has to be put somewhere. And because it was created simply by an actuarial identity, because the government said the credits will be sold for that price, and not because of $15 productivity gain, this $15 will contribute towards inflation and asset appreciation that is not sustainable in the mid-run.

Cap and trade can work, it is just that we must be sober about the risk it carries and think hard about getting it right. One approach would be to design a system that is entirely revenue neutral – so all that new money out there is offset by government spending. Another approach might be to smooth out price volatility by creating larger margin calls or position limits. Or, here’s another idea.