The President's Financial Regulatory Proposal

About two days a week throughout the fall last year there would be a black suburban parked on the street I walk from the red line to work. On these days I’d walk a little slower to see Treasury Secretary Paulson walk from a giant office building into the waiting car. I saw him the day after Lehman failed, the only thing fresh looking about him was his suit- and the day after the inauguration, with 8 foot high metal cage-like fences spilled down Penn Avenue as far as the eye could see, tons of trash blowing surreally in the freezing wind- this time looking more relaxed in his basketball shorts and unbuttoned shirt. It was pretty surreal to wake up and read the Journal or Times chronicling the latest historical market failure and then cross paths with its leading financial firefighter. A year later I’m afraid the sense of urgency of those fall months is fast diminishing. A tragedy of the last year is a terrible thing to waste. From the ashes of a failed regulatory system, that cost 3 million people their jobs and nearly as many their homes, and $7 trillion in wealth, is the promise to build a sleeker, more common-sense, more responsive regulatory system. And here many people will stop me simply with the semantics, “regulation” is a terrible word- so call it what you will. The basic concept though holds true in essentially every aspect of life. We don’t get on a jet plane and just hope the proper safety checks have been done and the pilot isn’t drunk, we “regulate” it, we don’t trust a stranger to deliver our new baby at a whim, we “regulate” it. So those who would notionally dismiss regulation as a bad thing should maybe stop flying or stop having kids.

The legal zeitgeist of these times is the President’s Financial Regulatory Reform proposal (http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf). In a little over two short months this entire white paper has been translated to authorizing language and sent to the Hill, where as usual it was met with a startling sense of complacency and criticism without much constructive feedback. If this can pass in some form by 2010 my hypothesis of complacency is proved wrong. If not, a similar asset bubble and burst cycle and all of the capital contraction, income decline and job loss and capital loss (repeat) is not just possible but probable. The impetus to correct a clearly insufficient financial regulatory regime – one that forced the government to choose between catastrophic failure and chaos or injecting huge of amounts of taxpayer dollars- is otherwise lost. Critics can say what they like about the choices made last year, but with Bear, Lehman, AIG, WaMu- those were the options. Here are some core tenets of the President’s regulatory agenda.

1) Capital ratios. A working group is currently drafting the details due out in a couple months. When the banks’ experienced severe asset valuation shocks they were forced to liquidate and perpetuate the cycle. With better loan loss provisioning this cycle could have been prevented. In practical terms, probably means going from tangible common equity ratios of 4% to 8%.

2) Resolution authority. The FDIC can repossess and either break up or auction off bankrupt depository institutions. There is no similar authority for non-depositories or holding companies that own depositories. The Fed can loan money to anyone or anything so long as it is last resort and there is sufficient collateral. If there isn’t, then there is no way to protect innocent bystanders from the consequences of large bank failure. The President’s proposal would permit the Fed with Treasury consent, to seize and efficiently break up large failing firms.

3) Preventing regulatory arbitrage. Under current law, thrift holding companies (banks with a higher share of mortgages created to facilitate liquidity in the housing market), industrial loan companies (like GMAC or GE Capital), credit card banks, trust companies and grandfathered non-bank banks are exempt from most supervisory requirements, simply because they were left out of the BHC Act. Firms (like Bear, Lehman, AIG, WaMu) simply owned one of these entities and could simultaneously avoid regulation while having access to the Fed’s lending if they got into trouble. This gave the public no risk management function but sole responsibility should they encounter significant risk. Heads I win, tails you lose. Financial companies should not be able to escape consolidated supervision by technicality.

4) Systemic risk regulation. The proposal creates a new category of Tier 1 financial companies which will be overseen by the Federal Reserve. These would be firms whose failure threatened the entire market, and would be subject to coordinated and robust prudential regulation. Bank holding companies consist of so many separate entities that they can have a dozen separate regulators each and allows firms to arbitrage the differences to their advantage.

5) Consumer financial protection. A central catalyst of the ’08 recession was the set of uninformed and stupid decisions consumers made- like buying houses they couldn’t ever afford or signing up for credit cards with early payback penalties. The proposal observes correctly that finance and economics have a distinct world view, one that does not manage the cultural, psychological and communications challenges inherent in good consumer advocacy. There are bright lines that could be established, but it takes clear authority and communication otherwise it will likely die in the interagency process as it has for decades. Without clear responsibility for common-sense consumer protection there can be no accountability. There are consumer protections for seatbelts, kids toys and lawnmowers, it's time for some for households' budgets too.

6) Office of National Insurance Regulator. The U.S. regulates the insurance industry essentially entirely at the State level and is the only G-20 country without a national framework for insurance oversight. There is clear executive will to do so, now we need legislative consensus.

7) Office of National Bank Supervisor. This would consolidate the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (which regulates interstate banks) and the Office of Thrift Supervision to oversee all national banks. One office in Treasury would have sole authority for national banks and be able to provide consolidated prudential oversight rather than the current fragmented system.

8) Financial Services Oversight Council. This would force regulators to actually talk to each other and coordinate policy while closing gaps in regulation. In ’08 we saw a fundamentally ad hoc response among the Fed, FDIC, OCC, Treasury and others with predictable turf wars and inefficiencies. Before any major action, like designating a firm a Tier 1 Financial Holding Company or intervening in an institution’s distress, this council would meet to have an integrated approach. It would be a consensus building forum while avoiding the tenuous nature of decision by committee by giving the Treasury Secretary executive authority as the Chairman.

9) Central clearinghouse of derivatives. This would establish a central resolution, clearing and payment exchange for derivates. Most derivatives today are cleared by JP Morgan and Mellon Bank of New York, so creating a consolidated exchange would be eminently doable. By providing transparency in this market, it would not prevent dealmaking, hedging or economically valuable speculation, it would just provide basic information to inform the price discovery mechanism. It was a surprise to most of the world that AIG had a hedge fund grafted on top of it that had drunkenly bet the house on the U.S. housing binge. If people could have seen this, the asset valuation collapse could have been incorporate in prices in near real time and prevented a huge dis-equilibrium and subsequent quick collapse. Contrary to popular misconception, this proposal would not prohibit custom derivatives.

People on the Hill who have better ideas should put them forward, but a system that allowed the consequences of the last year is definitionaly in need of repair. Just ask a harried former Republican Treasury Secretary.

The Markets could use some Pepto Bismol

As the stock market continues another whipsaw reversal of recent gains, counter intuitively 90 minutes after the largest deposit institution in the country reported double the profit from a year ago – I have one question: how is it possible that the markets, particularly financials, will not recover? Even disregarding the across the board strong profits of the remaining major financials in the last quarter, I defy anyone to explain how the fundamentals will not lead to a strong rebound in the mid-term (becoming shorter every day). Another interesting question is how much of the major bankruptcy and wealth destruction we’ve seen is a result of the bubble bursting versus people reacting to the bubble bursting? Washington Mutual for instance had significant write-downs on mortgages, but it also had $16b in withdrawals in its final week and a 90% drop in common share value over just 6 months. A situation like this will throw any company into trouble, whether it has a toxic or fortress balance sheet.

This is an especially interesting question because writedowns on assets are not losses. One, they are not realized, they don’t represent an actual outflow of cash, just a revised downward multi-year estimate which effects the current valuation, and two, they only really effect cash flow to the extent the market reacts adversely. Write-downs are serious and hurt balance sheets, but it is generally a very long-term signal with a lot of noise. Long-term because mortgages and bonds typically have a maturity lasting decades, and noisy because the characteristics of these securities as a whole is always changing based on the current underwriting standards of newly issued assets. But the market (read herd) takes this rather broad signal and immediately forces a translation into very short-term price signals. And I’m not sure the conversion factor is always spot on. To date the banks have written off several hundred billion in mortgages from their balance sheets, a significant shock no doubt, while the stock market has shed over $2 trillion in wealth. In other words, the market capitalization losses sustained is something like six times the actual writedowns. This is an even stronger shock when there is a run on existing contracts, from deposits to insurance product. The government realized in the 20s the unnecessary and preventable impact such reactions could have, and the FDIC has largely prevented it in commercial banks. That no such authority existed for multi-unit banking corporations like AIG or Lehman was rather remarkable considering how central to the financial system they had become.

Rather ironically, the only long term threat I see to robust bank recovery is the federal government. Unless people suddenly break a 10,000 year tradition, people will need shelters, likely, I know this is a stretch, in the form of houses. The rate of population growth and replacement dictates that about 1.3 million new homes need to be built in the U.S. as an annual baseline. In the last 12 months something like 400,000 were built. So the actual housing recovery timeframe is just a function of how big one thinks the bubble is, how big the surplus inventory is. I don’t think it’s much above 1 million, and we’ve already burned off about 900,000 of it. The rubber should finally hit the road soon. And once we get back to a supply-demand driven housing market, it’s hard to imagine that all these homes won’t require financing. In fact, 99.9% of them will. Pretty much everyone who doesn’t have a Louis-V with a milli in it like Lil Wayne will need the services of Bank of America or Citi or Wells Fargo. Thus, their first quarter earnings don’t seem to be mirage at all, more like a harbinger.

So there is more recovery in the pipeline, particularly when most of the recent earnings came from fixed-income arbitrage in a historically robust bond market. I have yet to hear anything close to a lucid argument that explains how housing and finance will not recover. And because prices have been falling for 16 months now, when it does turn it will likely have some strong inflection points. Balance sheets could reinflate relatively quickly as sideline homebuyers finally get on the field. The only potential long-term complicating factor here (assuming underwriting standards improve) then is the little issue of either servicing the government’s preferred stock loans, or worse selling off their common stock should they choose to convert it. The government should only consider converting their shares to equity if the stress tests show huge gaps that can absolutely not be filled any other way. And considering Citi, BoFa, JP Morgan, Wells all have 10% plus Tier I capital, and Treasury has $100 billion in the vault from TARP, and Goldman and Morgan already want to payback, I think the extent to which this has already been considered and bantered about as a serious idea is borderline irresponsible. We already know the market’s response to this rhetoric will dwarf the actual effects of any such real action. In fact, if the current sell-off continues investors can literally do whatever they want.

A Simmer Down Now

Nobel winning economist and liberal zeitgeist Paul Krugman suggested today with a straight face that we return to a financial system, as he put it “like the 60s” - pure depository institutions saving and lending with little to no securitization or hedging. He also seemed to half-heartedly pick a fight with Larry Summers. I hope Larry will put down his 17th diet Coke of the day for a moment and take 20 minutes to draft a response for next week’s Financial Times. It would be a debate we would all benefit from. But then again maybe Summers thinks Krugman’s argument is too much of a straw man, too weak and unthreatening to solicit a response.

Krugman’s general sentiment is dead on, in that the financial system of the future cannot replicate the one we’ve just had. But this does not mean we have to roll back all financial innovation in extremus. This doesn’t mean we need to purge Wall Street or banks of anything that is a little complicated. I think more than anything else it means we just need more checks and balances, or in some places the creation of them, like over the counter trading. And it means we need to “keep it simple stupid.” The experiences of the last 6 months are not so much about the creation of new or wildly complicated financial products, as it is a reminder that firms need at least 5% or so cash on hand and need to verify the information their loans are based on (e.g. mortgage applicants). If these two things had been in place we wouldn’t be here today, and Krugman would not have the bully pulpit to adopt his pseudo neo-Ludite financial perspective.

Look at it from the perspective of a newly graduated college student with a decent job, who wants to buy her first house. The ability of this person to get a loan, and the interest charged on it is directly related to the willingness of banks to provide it. A typical bank will have 90% of their portfolio seeking a return in some respect. A good deal of these will be wrapped in recourse debt instruments to provide diversity, and often produce a margin via selling. This diversity represents more risk control for the banks and thus confidence to lend, and this margin represents more money the bank can lend, and thus more favorable credit terms for our post-collegiate house owning aspirant. And the security is only unsustainable, only contributes to a bubble, if the face value is below the current value of the future cash flows – e.g. if significant numbers of those who borrowed the consumer debt that stands behind the security will not actually pay up. This risk can be prevented quite easily with accurate information about the borrowers. This is widely applied today in the government’s new housing plan, which won’t deal with potential borrowers above a 38% debt/income ratio. Of course, to determine this you have to actually record this information. A greasy-haired condo pusher in El Paso wasn’t always accurately reporting this information to banks, surprise surprise! and banks were eager to make the deal anyway to push it up the chain. But this little scheme does not mean securities cannot be properly valued. In fact it just means the Fed needs to require actual records of income to be reported, as they did in February. So, securities can actually be worth more than their market price, and it’s good for the investor who sees a profit, good for the banks who generate more financing, and good for our college grad who can afford a slightly better house on better terms. Krugman would have us, in one radical fell swoop, nix this whole concept. Dangerous idea.

The other part of his argument attacks the big spooky market of derivates, e.g. futures, options and swaps- concepts that have only been around for hundreds of years- from farmers wanting to protect their crops from future unpredictable weather to British spice traders who didn’t want their global deals to be subject to the volatility of foreign exchange currencies. Derivatives just allow risk control, and if you happen to control this risk yourself, an incentive to do so in the form of profit. And yes, rules need to be in place. Like the degree of leveraging and collateral, or who’s trading where- tracking all this is in the works. Yet high finance is not the only place where Lord of the Flies will play out if there aren’t basic rules, and this caveat is no reason to pick on Wall Street. The credit default swaps (you will swap money for my asset if it turns out to totally suck) fiasco with AIG was not a result of the derivatives or futures system, but because they invested in a bubble (quite happily) and didn’t have nearly enough cash on hand to meet their obligations. Options and swaps are banks’ insurance, and without them they will understandably lend a lot less. Which means Krugman’s argument hurts just about everyone who wants to ever use money for anything. We require insurance for a $2,000 Datsun with 270,000 miles, it's the law, why would we not have insurance on $1 billion in mortgage loans? Or 20 million barrels a day of crude that we import? Or pensions? Or… Risk control is paramount and lowers the costs of financing and increases the availability of productivity enhancing capital. Keep it simple stupid.

Executive Compromise: The Contrarian View

There has been much populist celebration over President Obama’s recent freezing of bank executives’ salaries who receive federal money, and before that the freezing of his senior staff’s salaries. I’m not adamantly against this, but I don’t see how it accomplishes much of anything. So I’ll take the contrarian view – the usually more fun view. Firms already have every reason to avoid taking government money - because they’re not getting “bailed out” at all. They’re giving up huge stakes in their companies and the future profits that go with it, and assuming new debt to pay the government back. AIG gave up nearly 80% of its assets in the form of preferred stock and warrants. This means everyone who has parked money with them is now in the back of the line behind the federal government for dividends or shareholder privileges, experienced huge price dilution, and will likely see the government slowly and painfully liquidate their holdings. The shareholders don’t want that, the executives don’t want that, employees don’t want that, no one wants that – it’s a last resort. So the notion that they’re willing to basically give up the entire company so they can get their hands on public money just so they can get their holiday bonuses seems implausible. Also, Wall Street bonuses typically make up about a third of the NYC tax base in a given year. Without these bonuses, the city faces an even bigger budget gap, has to cut more services in a time where government purchases are needed to create demand, and ironically some of the very funds being loaned to banks in the first place.

And then there’s the whole issue of incentives. There are very few people who have the experience or capacity to run large financial institutions, let alone fix them when they are awash in problems, and it’s not like they have nothing better to do. The Jamie Dimons or Lloyd Blankfeins are not short on job opportunities. Cutting compensation 95%+ isn’t exactly the recipe for recruiting the best managers and thinkers in a time when they are most needed to sort through a menagerie of problems. The financial downturn was precipitated by a phenomenal disregard for basic due diligence. Most people put more effort into buying a used car than Citi did buying $100 billion of bonds, as Robert Rubin put it – “it was an afterthought.” Jamie Dimon largely protected JP Morgan in the summer of ’07 just by realizing he couldn’t really explain the slight uptick in defaults, and once they realized that they also realized they had no idea why the bonds were rated so high, so they divested. And diligence, as the word suggests, is not easy or particularly enjoyable. These firms will avoid further trouble only when they have executive committees that take their time and scrutinize their every step. If they’re not rewarded, if incentives are muted, it becomes less clear that they have a motivation to perform this diligence. Misaligned incentives (like in securities bundling or rumor-fueled short selling) got us into this situation; a system capable of preventing it will not emerge until these basic incentives are realigned. And last, the success or failure of these firms does not hinge on the value of their relatively meager salaries. President Obama has about 300 senior staff that earn about $180,000 a year and usually get a 5% annual pay increase. Assuming Obama keeps this freeze in place for 8 years this amounts to $24m in savings. The economic system is facing challenges on the order of millions of jobs and trillions of dollars. And during this time, good policy, and the hard-working men and women behind developing it, are more important than ever. Saving a few million bucks and cutting pay to the people you most rely on doesn’t seem to accomplish much.

What people really care about is “are they doing a good job”. People care about good decisions, good investments and good profits. If the firms were above water today, no one would raise a peep about their compensation. Targeting annual bonuses confuses the issue, which is ultimately one of bottom line performance, something that usually requires more compensation, not less.

Improving, not just saving, Social Security

Yeah, yeah, yeah. You’ve heard it all before. Social security is not looking so secure, but why does it really matter? I think most people would probably say because it would certainly be nice to get that monthly check in the mail once they’ve retired, particularly when 7.5% of every paycheck is taken out for it. Who likes to pay something for nothing? After all, the current system is projected to take in less money than it pays out around 2017, which means it will eat up the budget, which means even tighter capital markets and higher future debt. And then of course it’s projected to go bankrupt in 2040. It’s all very boring.

But the bigger reason we should fix social security - and not just patch it up with a million clever little ideas, say by lowering the inflation index or pushing back the retirement age, which will succeed only in postponing insolvency and making people work harder for less, but not really improve anything - is because of the enormous… opportunity cost! I wish it could cut aluminum cans in half or something, but we’ll have to settle for opportunity cost. Think about the difference between every dollar of your paycheck that goes into the Social Security Trust Fund, and then is subsequently spent immediately and preserved in the form of debt, versus every dollar going going into a well balanced mutual fund and earning interest. And then multiply over, oh, say four decades. Say on average you make a real income of $50,000 a year for the next 40 years, and the standard 7.65% of this is contributed to payroll taxes, this is $153,000 in principal. When that money goes into the Trust Fund, the government at best will nullify the deleterious effects of inflation, and worse yet, may actually lose purchasing power depending on the spread of government bonds versus inflation, or still worse, may decide never to pay it.

On the other hand, pick any ten year period of the stock market, any 10 year performance period of Wall Street, and the average returns will never be below 7%. Not during the Great Depression, not during S & L or dotcom, not now, not ever. Business cycles are real, they happen, but the ups and downs average to a healthy trend. Saying something is reliable because it has never failed is all you can really go on. For instance, people banking on the Social Security Trust Fund paying them out around the middle of this century often cite how much more reliable a Government IOU is because the government has never defaulted on its debt. True, but then the rationale of the safety of Wall Street is no less reliable. The government has never defaulted on its obligations. And Wall Street has never produced less than 7% per decade in returns, let alone a loss. So say over the 40 years you’ve contributed that $153,000 to the government and the market just hits the bottom of that 7% return, you still turn that money into over $600k. Assuming the best, this is a 400% difference from what the government would pay out, a very steep opportunity cost. Now there are no guarantees. And if people would like to play the “more conservative card” of just paying into the fund and getting a government guarantee, they should be able to. But, just like U.S. Senators, people should have the choice to contribute their income into actual funds. The Regular ol’ Person system could be essentially the same design as the Senators’. There would be a pension board that oversees 5 or so broad investment plans, divided by their equity/fixed income ratio, but all diversified and managed by professionals and overseen to regulate leverage and risk (something missing since about 2004 when the SEC removed net capital holding requirements). The point is people couldn’t just invest wherever the mood struck them, there would be a small menu of balanced funds to choose from. And because of the simplicity of the rules - 5 plans, no more than 10:1 or so leveraging, it would be clear whether funds were being abused/Madoffed in any way.

I hope that any future modification to Social Security does not reflexively deny individuals a choice in how their earnings are used. I think this is the compromise that can be struck - people who like the current system (retooled with some painful actuarial adjustments) can stay with it. But not allowing individuals a choice to place their payroll earnings into a balanced fund seems to me to be denying people an awful lot, and for nothing but the concerns of other people who would be unaffected. It would have the added benefits of freeing the government up from a lot of debt and providing much needed private capital injections to our financial institutions. A lot of this could be used to do things like deploy clean energy, build smart grids, in short create good jobs. And of course there are details, there always are. When money from current workers is placed in an investment fund, and not siphoned towards current retirees, there will have to be bridge financing in the form of more debt. Yet so long as much of Asia has a 30% savings rate, and so long as there are sovereign wealth funds, there will be ample capital to absorb a few more government securities. Plus, paying these off in the future will be easier than waiting for the system to slide into debt and paying then, as the pension system will be more sustainable and profitable thanks to new productivity from deeper capital markets and decreased government retirement obligations - meaning a broader economic base. And there will have to be cut off points for when people can make the transition. And there will have to be a little bit of private earnings skimmed by the Board as reserves to provide insurance to people who might pick particularly unlucky times to retire – in this way they would be guaranteed a minimal payment not below the regular system. Bueller?

But the point is, legitimate debate about the system doesn’t have to ruin anything. Those who think the government is the best universal retirement planner and want that legal guarantee can have it. And those who would prefer to fund government managed private investments with their money can do that. Now this is bipartisanship This isn’t a parlor room discussion or a game of gotchya between editorialists (oh how Stiglitz, Krugman, Summers, Brooks et. al. love to seem the smartest guy in the room). It’s a very pragmatic day-to-day kitchen table decision. And I think given the choice, people should be given more opportunity, not less.

On another note, the CBO recently scored the House stimulus bill. It estimates 7% of the energy investments will be spent within 2 years and less than 50% of the transportation dollars spent in 4 years. This is too slow to provide immediate stimulus and generally conforms with what the Council of Economic Adviser's new chair Christina Romer has shown in her work. I think the second half of TARP ($150b to buy up worst assets, $150b for continued recapitalization and $50b for mortgage refinancing, which could save 1m+), combined with a more focused $100b stimulus could have great effect.

MLS to Portland and Some Econ

After Adrian Hanauer’s brilliant orchestration of bringing MLS to Seattle (in ’09 baby!) I think it’s Portland’s turn. Check it out - http://www.mlstoportland.com/ With an estimated cost to the city of $85m and annual benefit of $30m it would be a big win all around. Bring MLS to Ptown baby!!

And here are 10 macroeconomic prescriptions that might be good now that everyone’s talking about economic policy in DC.

10) Independent World Class Regulators for all Large Financial Firms – Independent Meaning they set their budget and world class meaning they follow GAAP, this wasn’t the case for GSEs or I-banks – this includes 10% reserve ratios, not 2.5% say like Fannie and Freddie, e.g. better leveraging

9) Housing PITI – Principal Interest Taxes Insurance – Documented and verified. This only became a rule in July 2008 when Bernanke pushed it though at a Fed meeting! (And it won't take effect until Feb '09) Why did it take so long to require borrowers to check a box at the end of their mortgage docs releasing their tax records? Then Standard and Poor's or Moody's would have had actual data to base their bond ratings on. The FDIC has been restructuring loans at or below a 30% debt/income ratio to much success (but it can only do it to assets it has acquired, which is basically IndyMac) - this would be a good threshold for lenders to loosely base restructuring (after all they will take a bit of an interest rate hit, but it's better than losing the whole loan). There's also a new study which estimates a million mortgage defaults could be prevented via utilizing $10b of TARP to increase the fees HUD provides private mortgage securitizors (source of over 50% of current defaults) get for restructuring a loan. Right now there is little incentive for them to make the effort to restructure versus just write off or auction off.

8) Global Exchange Harmony – If you trade in a market you are subject to its rules, for instance European/London traders in NYMEX are often exempt as they are considered to be regulated from abroad, not good, e.g. close loopholes. If a satellite trading shop for a European firm opens in Atlanta it should be fully regulated by the U.S.

7) Fix Entitlements – Non-discretionary spending is 65% of federal spending today and will continue to spur deficit spending and eat up the budget, which crowds out private investments – either a Greenspan style fix by say indexing benefits to the CPI rather than wage and bumping up the retirement age, or more innovative (and promising) approaches like volunteer personal savings accounts (the market has never had less than 7% returns over a decade, ever)

6) Infrastructure stimulus – Largely in the form of revolving loans to states and localities, including national direct current electricity grid (particularly applied in so called 'solar parks' which establish all the prerequisites for solar permitting and transmission in government land leased by private firms, removing the uncertainty that currently inhibits at scale development along with #5) and water infrastructure

5) Embrace the clean economy – less taxes on labor and income and more on pollution. The marginal social cost of carbon according to the Stern Report, the International Academy of Sciences and the U.N. is about $30/ton CO2, conveniently about the exact amount needed to make renewables and sequestration cheaper than coal, tar sands, oil shale etc. The IRS could oversee this program with existing authorities at the point carbon enters the economy, either the ground or port, and then recycle all revenues back via tax cuts.

4) 50% margin call (collateral) for paper (non-deliverable) hedging and speculating, today it’s often 2-5% which encourages speculating and thus bubbles

3) Warranty on bond ratings – If collateral backed bonds get a rating from one of the big agencies that proves grossly inaccurate they should take big haircuts in their contracts

2) Successful WTO Doha round – Trade needs to be opened up, and this means new negotiations with more flexibility on easing subsidies and accepting developing economy safeguards (this was the big sticking point)

1) Relax – Expectations and anxiety are self-fulfilling, losses are only realized if you sell, most of the big banks had balance sheets that were OK, it was the market cap losses that did them in. Citigroup for instance has lost $2b each of the last couple quarters, on a balance sheet of nearly $2 trillion and with tons of cash on hand (and $25b more thanks to TARP). And yet they have a current market cap of $21b, grossly undervalued in my opinion, traders would benefit from some perspective - any company, even very strong ones, can be undone by 90%+ market cap losses (which all that have gone under have sufferred). If bovine mass hysteria dictates market positions, any company can be victim - and valuation models are powerless in the face of this. If Wall Street focuses on creating wealth rather than manufacturing it (creating wealth includes products, services, consulting, insurance, liquidity/risk management, and manufacturing it includes things like arbitraging bond rates with SIVs (structured investment vehicles) or backing capital raises with deteriorating underwriting standards, like subprime backed collateralized debt obligations or massive paper speculation/derivative bets). Wealth production beyond wealth creation is the root of bubbles, and they will always burst.

Also, I think the Big Three should get their additional $25b, which is far far less than it would cost the economy if they failed. But they need to realize this is a bridge loan in two senses: 1) getting on a sustainable cash flow trajectory and 2) finally innovating. The top reason they are in this position is not because of events of the last few months but because they have been making the same vehicle since Carter was in the White House, and actually have gone backwards in fuel efficiency. As a result they've had their shirt handed to them by Japan and German automakers. Maybe with the Chevy Volt the Big Three can finally be out front on the innovation curve instead of three decades behind.