As the stock market continues another whipsaw reversal of recent gains, counter intuitively 90 minutes after the largest deposit institution in the country reported double the profit from a year ago – I have one question: how is it possible that the markets, particularly financials, will not recover? Even disregarding the across the board strong profits of the remaining major financials in the last quarter, I defy anyone to explain how the fundamentals will not lead to a strong rebound in the mid-term (becoming shorter every day). Another interesting question is how much of the major bankruptcy and wealth destruction we’ve seen is a result of the bubble bursting versus people reacting to the bubble bursting? Washington Mutual for instance had significant write-downs on mortgages, but it also had $16b in withdrawals in its final week and a 90% drop in common share value over just 6 months. A situation like this will throw any company into trouble, whether it has a toxic or fortress balance sheet.
This is an especially interesting question because writedowns on assets are not losses. One, they are not realized, they don’t represent an actual outflow of cash, just a revised downward multi-year estimate which effects the current valuation, and two, they only really effect cash flow to the extent the market reacts adversely. Write-downs are serious and hurt balance sheets, but it is generally a very long-term signal with a lot of noise. Long-term because mortgages and bonds typically have a maturity lasting decades, and noisy because the characteristics of these securities as a whole is always changing based on the current underwriting standards of newly issued assets. But the market (read herd) takes this rather broad signal and immediately forces a translation into very short-term price signals. And I’m not sure the conversion factor is always spot on. To date the banks have written off several hundred billion in mortgages from their balance sheets, a significant shock no doubt, while the stock market has shed over $2 trillion in wealth. In other words, the market capitalization losses sustained is something like six times the actual writedowns. This is an even stronger shock when there is a run on existing contracts, from deposits to insurance product. The government realized in the 20s the unnecessary and preventable impact such reactions could have, and the FDIC has largely prevented it in commercial banks. That no such authority existed for multi-unit banking corporations like AIG or Lehman was rather remarkable considering how central to the financial system they had become.
Rather ironically, the only long term threat I see to robust bank recovery is the federal government. Unless people suddenly break a 10,000 year tradition, people will need shelters, likely, I know this is a stretch, in the form of houses. The rate of population growth and replacement dictates that about 1.3 million new homes need to be built in the U.S. as an annual baseline. In the last 12 months something like 400,000 were built. So the actual housing recovery timeframe is just a function of how big one thinks the bubble is, how big the surplus inventory is. I don’t think it’s much above 1 million, and we’ve already burned off about 900,000 of it. The rubber should finally hit the road soon. And once we get back to a supply-demand driven housing market, it’s hard to imagine that all these homes won’t require financing. In fact, 99.9% of them will. Pretty much everyone who doesn’t have a Louis-V with a milli in it like Lil Wayne will need the services of Bank of America or Citi or Wells Fargo. Thus, their first quarter earnings don’t seem to be mirage at all, more like a harbinger.
This is an especially interesting question because writedowns on assets are not losses. One, they are not realized, they don’t represent an actual outflow of cash, just a revised downward multi-year estimate which effects the current valuation, and two, they only really effect cash flow to the extent the market reacts adversely. Write-downs are serious and hurt balance sheets, but it is generally a very long-term signal with a lot of noise. Long-term because mortgages and bonds typically have a maturity lasting decades, and noisy because the characteristics of these securities as a whole is always changing based on the current underwriting standards of newly issued assets. But the market (read herd) takes this rather broad signal and immediately forces a translation into very short-term price signals. And I’m not sure the conversion factor is always spot on. To date the banks have written off several hundred billion in mortgages from their balance sheets, a significant shock no doubt, while the stock market has shed over $2 trillion in wealth. In other words, the market capitalization losses sustained is something like six times the actual writedowns. This is an even stronger shock when there is a run on existing contracts, from deposits to insurance product. The government realized in the 20s the unnecessary and preventable impact such reactions could have, and the FDIC has largely prevented it in commercial banks. That no such authority existed for multi-unit banking corporations like AIG or Lehman was rather remarkable considering how central to the financial system they had become.
Rather ironically, the only long term threat I see to robust bank recovery is the federal government. Unless people suddenly break a 10,000 year tradition, people will need shelters, likely, I know this is a stretch, in the form of houses. The rate of population growth and replacement dictates that about 1.3 million new homes need to be built in the U.S. as an annual baseline. In the last 12 months something like 400,000 were built. So the actual housing recovery timeframe is just a function of how big one thinks the bubble is, how big the surplus inventory is. I don’t think it’s much above 1 million, and we’ve already burned off about 900,000 of it. The rubber should finally hit the road soon. And once we get back to a supply-demand driven housing market, it’s hard to imagine that all these homes won’t require financing. In fact, 99.9% of them will. Pretty much everyone who doesn’t have a Louis-V with a milli in it like Lil Wayne will need the services of Bank of America or Citi or Wells Fargo. Thus, their first quarter earnings don’t seem to be mirage at all, more like a harbinger.
So there is more recovery in the pipeline, particularly when most of the recent earnings came from fixed-income arbitrage in a historically robust bond market. I have yet to hear anything close to a lucid argument that explains how housing and finance will not recover. And because prices have been falling for 16 months now, when it does turn it will likely have some strong inflection points. Balance sheets could reinflate relatively quickly as sideline homebuyers finally get on the field. The only potential long-term complicating factor here (assuming underwriting standards improve) then is the little issue of either servicing the government’s preferred stock loans, or worse selling off their common stock should they choose to convert it. The government should only consider converting their shares to equity if the stress tests show huge gaps that can absolutely not be filled any other way. And considering Citi, BoFa, JP Morgan, Wells all have 10% plus Tier I capital, and Treasury has $100 billion in the vault from TARP, and Goldman and Morgan already want to payback, I think the extent to which this has already been considered and bantered about as a serious idea is borderline irresponsible. We already know the market’s response to this rhetoric will dwarf the actual effects of any such real action. In fact, if the current sell-off continues investors can literally do whatever they want.
1 comment:
Looks like you nailed the conventional wisdom a couple weeks before it became such.
Nice.
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