

One, he needs to contain costs. Healthcare expenses are growing far faster than the revenue base is expanding and at the current trajectory, non-discretionary spending will eat up the entire federal budget in about 25 years. A good model of controlling prices can be found in Japan, where they have half the per capita healthcare costs and twice the per capita utilization rates as Americans. That sounds good. In Japan the government has sole purchasing power of pharmaceuticals and healthcare procedures. They use their massive negotiating power to exert downward price pressure on everything from the cost of antibiotics to the cost of an EKG. Private insurance providers can still design their own policies and set their own prices, but the basic inputs that go into those plans are purchased in bulk by the entire government. The same concept is already pervasive in the private sector, where a few key buyers negotiate entire supply chains. Secretary Daschle’s HHS would be a great place to house the Office of Negotiation, where they set up 5-year forward purchase agreements on the largest and most common drugs and procedures.
Second, just like decoupling in the electric utilities sector, there needs to be decoupling in the medical sector. Utilities over the last decade or so have realized that electric providers in a normal market have no incentive to be efficient; in fact they have an incentive for their customers to use as much energy as possible because it translates into larger profits. This results in excess energy usage and general inefficiency. This has been more or less solved via utilities taking a percent or two out of monthly electric bills and redistributing it based on a formulaic measure of a company’s energy efficiency. Suddenly energy efficiency is monetized and energy providers start paying attention. The same basic idea should be established in the medical industry, where doctors, particularly specialists, have an incentive to carry out, and charge for, expensive procedures. Daschle’s HHS should charge a small fee to existing healthcare providers (maybe .5%) and reward medical providers who are particularly efficient in their utilization. This does not mean doctors will be rewarded for not doing expensive procedures for sick patients who need them; it means they will have an incentive not to do procedures just because they are profitable (which is perfectly rationale). HHS could measure certain key and widely available statistics, like referral and utilization rates and costs per treatment at the institutional level, and then reward those institutions accordingly, decoupling profit from wasteful overutilization.
And three, if Obama and Daschle really want universal coverage they will have to subsidize about the lowest quintile of American households. This is a decision Americans will ultimately have to make, but controlling prices and rewarding efficiency will still not be enough to provide universal coverage. Obama proposes instituting a healthcare tax on employers who do not contribute to their employees’ coverage as a means to fund subsidy programs. This seems like a good idea, as it preserves price parity across the market, as every firm will have to meet the same basic operating costs (chipping in to provide basic healthcare and not free-riding on firms that already do). Revenues here could be distributed by Daschle’s HHS based on a family’s combined income level to provide basic coverage for the uninsured.
I don’t think Secretary Daschle will be knocking on my door anytime soon, but I hope that once he hears from all these households that he starts getting specific soon. Generic goals or hollow bromides have gotten us nowhere with healthcare reform in the past, and today’s no different. Healthcare reform will be a long difficult debate, and policymakers should start working on the nuts and bolts now. None of these ideas is easy or particularly desirable, but neither are higher taxes in the future for worse benefits.
No comments:
Post a Comment